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Terrorism is based on the use of violence to achieve a goal, such as specific 
governmental policy changes. Sometimes terrorists win, sometimes they lose, 
and sometimes terror campaigns end in stalemates. The prolonged conflicts 
between states and terrorist organizations deplete human and financial 
resources, public support and time. This thesis aims to test under which 
conditions in terrorism cases both sides feel themselves caught in stalemates. A 
historical case study between Turkey and the PKK terrorist organization was 
used to test hypotheses. William Zartman’s Theory of Ripeness handles this 
question using the mutually damaging stalemate phenomenon as a condition of 
ripeness and one of the direct reasons for a decision to negotiate. While 
exploring the theory, the writer also came up with the idea of importing Mitchell 
and Crocker’s mutually enticing opportunities to model as a condition of ripeness 
for both sides. Actions taken during the 1990s and 2000s give insights into the 
two aforementioned phenomena, respectively. The former period shows how the 
Turkish state broke the stalemate and checkmated the PKK, and the latter 
focuses on internal and regional developments and opportunities as emerging 
rewards of this success. 
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Terrorism is based on the use of violence against the innocent to achieve 
a goal, such as specific governmental policy changes. Sometimes terrorists win, 
sometimes they lose, and sometimes their terror campaigns end in stalemates. 
This thesis will focus on stalemates between states and terrorist organizations. 
Generally, the current literature regarding such stalemates focuses on internal 
wars and state-to-state disputes. Examining terrorism from the point of view of 
stalemates can produce beneficial outcomes. In that context, this research asks 
under what conditions do opposing sides find themselves at an impasse?  
A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
In particular, this thesis aims to present a broader understanding of 
mutually damaging stalemates by focusing on the case of the  urdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), and determining whether the impasse reached in the case of the 
PKK terrorist organization is detrimental to Turkey. Most scholars view this 
deadlock phenomenon as occurring in states involved in internal wars or ethnic 
conflicts. However, this thesis will focus on a stalemate related to terrorism 
cases, because sometimes terrorism campaigns end in negotiated stalemates, 
such as those involving the Irish Republican Army1 (IRA) and the Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna2 (ETA) cases.  
The conditions that contribute to a deadlock are the source of much 
de ate. Stalemates may emanate from the each side’s perception that it is 
engaged in a costly situation that has no positive outcome. In some situations, 
the wrong strategies are implemented, and both sides are left feeling physically, 
materially, or politically exhausted, which may lead to a stalemate. Within this 
context, the intent of this thesis is to analyze Turkey’s conflict with the PKK 
                                            
1 Dean G.  ruitt  “Escalation and De-escalation in  symmetric Conflict ” Dynamics of 
Asymmetric Conflict 2, no.1 (2009): 27. 
2 James  . Esser and Christine M. Bridges  “Negotiating with Terrorists: The Case of The 
Basques and Spain ” Peace and Conflict 17 (2011): 60, 61. 
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terrorist organization over three decades as a case study. Using William 
Zartman’s Ripeness Theory,3 in which he explains the mutual hurting stalemate 
as a precondition of the ripe moment for conflict resolution, we will develop some 
inductive results from our case study. 
The methodology of the thesis will include a historical case study of the 
conflict between Turkey and the PKK terrorist organization. The author will look 
at two different periods and discuss them as to whether they are stalemates 
between Turkey and the PKK. The variation within this one case holds other 
variables constant as much as possible. The first group of stalemates to be 
discussed occurred between 1993 and 1999, in which the PKK announced its so-
called unilateral ceasefire4 decisions four times, respectively, in 1993, 1995, 
1998, and 1999. The significance of and the reasons for these decisions and 
whether there is a connection with a stalemate will be the focus. The related 
regional and external developments, such as the ending of the Cold War, the first 
Gulf War, and structural changes in Iraq, and their effects will also be discussed. 
The second group of stalemates to be discussed occurred in the era 
between 2004 and the present. In this era the PKK announced so-called 
unilateral ceasefire decisions four times again in 2006, 2009, 2011 and in 2013. 
In this process Turkey first unofficially then officially held talks with the    ’s 
European representatives in Oslo and with Abdullah Ocalan in Imrali via Hakan 
Fidan, undersecretary of Turkey’s National  ntelligence Organization (MIT) and 
other MIT representatives.5 The significance of these talks and whether they 
represent a perception of stalemate from the perspective of the Turkish 
government will be discussed. 
                                            
3 William Zartman  “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond ” in International Conflict 
Resolution after the Cold War, edited by Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 2000), 226. 
4 A ceasefire is a technical term that refers to the temporal ending of a conflict between 
states. Sometimes a terrorist organization will call a ceasefire to create political leverage or 
legitimize its actions. For this reason  this thesis will use the term “so-called unilateral ceasefire.”  
5 “     lk  ez   ikladi... slo’Da Neler  ldu ”  The     Declared For The First Time What 
Did Happen In Oslo?] Aksam Gazetesi, April 24, 2013. http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/pkk-ilk-
kez-acikladiosloda-neler-oldu/haber-199057.  
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In the theory section, this thesis uses an expected utility model to explain 
the logic of stalemates. To provide the necessary background on the existing 
view of stalemates, a literature review is included later in this chapter. As 
previously mentioned, the existing stalemate literature generally discusses this 
deadlock phenomenon as it occurs between states involved in internal wars or 
ethnic conflicts. Thus, another goal of this thesis is to contribute a fresh 
perspective to the body of literature examining this phenomenon. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
The historical cost benefit analysis of the struggle between Turkey and the 
PKK plays a major role in future expectations. This analysis enables the parties 
involved to evaluate the situation and predict the likelihood of it ending in a 
stalemate. Cost benefit analysis of the adversaries includes 1) strategies, 2) 
resources, 3) political willingness, and 4) external developments, as identified in 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Strategies employed by both sides in a conflict influence 
the lifetime dynamics of the conflicts themselves, and the methods implemented 
as strategies may cause the struggles to reach a stalemate. Most often states 
take a direct strategy that targets their adversaries’ capability rather than their will 
to fight. For this reason strategies are major factors that shape the endgame 
dynamics of the problems and ultimately may cause the situations to end in a 
stalemate. 
Hypothesis 2: The objective indicators of conflicts are resources used in 
the struggle. Both sides make calculations over the losses they experience, and 
those losses might be personnel, material, money, or time. As long as each side 
has enough resources to continue, the conflict is unlikely to reach a stalemate. 
Hypothesis 3: The political will of the adversaries, which is subject to 
change with pu lic support and leaders’ personalities or a change in leadership 
itself during the process, may cause sides to end up in a stalemate. 
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Hypothesis 4: External or regional conditions which create secure 
resources for terrorist organizations, such as safe heavens, state sponsorship or 
financial resources, may lead to an impasse. Especially since the end of the Cold 
War, terrorist organizations have sought self-financing methods and evolved into 
criminal organizations to fund themselves. Failed states, especially in the Middle 
East and Asia, have hosted several terrorist organizations and provided safe 
havens for them. The First Gulf War, the 9/11 attacks, the Afghanistan and Iraq 
campaigns, The Arab Spring and its continuation in Syria are some of the 
external factors that have reshaped dynamics in the Middle East. All these 
external conditions and safe havens enabled terrorist organizations to secure 
financing routes and methods, and to reorganize themselves, which have led to 
stalemates. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to explain why and when conflicts are susceptible to resolution 
through negotiations  Zartman has created the “Ripeness Theory.”  ccording to 
this theory  “ f the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to  e in a 
hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way 
out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution to 
 egin).”6 The basic underlying element in a Mutual Hurting Stalemate (MHS) is 
the cost-benefit analysis of the contentious parties indicating they cannot 
escalate to victory and so they remain in a deadlock, which is painful for both, 
and so there is no benefit in sustaining the conflict.7 According to Zartman, 
ripeness contains both objective and subjective elements, and it is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for negotiations to begin.8  
In his book, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, 
Zartman associates the point of ripeness with two different terms: the plateau 
                                            
6 Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond ” 228‒229. 
7 Ibid., 229. 
8   id.  227‒229. 
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and the precipice, which produce different pressures as, respectively, deadlocks 
and deadlines. A plateau or deadlock refers to that neither side of the conflict is 
able to achieve victory or goals by following their unilateral policies.  A plateau 
must be perceived by both sides of the conflict as a hurting stalemate, providing 
no possibilities for decisive escalation or escape. The unilateral policies of the 
sides must be seen as a more costly and less likely achievable outcome than a 
policy of negotiation.9  
On the other hand a precipice is the opposite of the plateau, with an 
impending or just occurred catastrophe in which both parties of conflict feel 
themselves in the losing position. It represents a realization that matters will get 
worse if the parties do not find better solutions that negotiation seeks to define.10 
In summary, Zartman claims that adversaries of a conflict will be likely to 
consider a negotiated solution when they expect a long period of costly clash 
together with a low probability of obtaining their goals and a high perceived 
probability of a catastrophe. It can be concluded for a terrorist organization that 
ending up in a stalemate with a state is one way of obtaining some of their aims 
and a success for their side.  
The Entrapment model pioneered by Edmead11 and Teger,12 on the other 
hand, describes how decision makers involved in a conflict become trapped in 
the continued pursuit of victory even after the costs seem unbearable for both 
sides. The costs become reasons for each side to continue for a win in order to 
justify physiological and political sacrifices they have already made.13 The 
paradigm here is the perception of the terms of winning and losing. Counter-
                                            
9 William Zartman, Ripe For Resolution Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 232. 
10 Ibid. 
11 F. Edmead, Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation (New York: UNI-TAR, 
1971). 
12 Allan I. Teger, Too Much Invested To Quit (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980). 
13 Christopher R. Mitchell  “Cutting Losses: Reflections on  ppropriate Timing ” The School 
for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, Septem er 1  1995  1‒4  
http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/wp_9_mitchell_0.pdf. 
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terrorism strategies are employed as long-term approaches, even though the 
policymakers who implement them are generally looking for decisive and quick 
results. That is why it is hard for people to find a middle ground between the two 
sides in a conflict, and why they seek strict outcome definitions.  
 n “Cutting Losses: Reflections on  ppropriate Timing ” Christopher 
Mitchell argues that adversaries may enter negotiations not only because they 
confront a mutually hurting stalemate but also because a set of favorable 
conjunctional factors force them to do so. The emphasis is on new benefits rather 
than existing or anticipated costs, on rewards for adopting alternatives rather 
than on sacrifices that have to be compensated. From his point of view, a 
negotiated outcome can occur only if the right perception of rewards appears.14 
According to Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, and Sung Hee Kim, conflicts 
escalate for a while and then reach stalemate: a situation in which neither side 
can win, but neither side wants to step back or accept loss. They claim that 
stalemates emerge for a number of reasons, such as failed tactics, depletion of 
available resources to continue a conflict, a decline in the support of the conflict 
by members or allies, or an increase in the costs.15 The hypotheses of this thesis 
are constructed on the basis of these reasons. It is important to understand the 
endgame dynamics of conflicts and the definition of results to connect the idea of 
stalemate with these reasons. 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft in his article  “How the Weak Win Wars:   Theory of 
 symmetric Conflict ” emphasizes the ideas of states’ and adversaries’ tactics 
and approaches countering each other, and their decisive and power irrelevant 
roles on the outcome of asymmetric conflict. According to him every strategy has 
an ideal counterstrategy, and the strategic interaction of opponents leads them to 
come up with four optimal approaches: direct-direct/indirect-indirect and direct-
indirect/indirect-direct (Figure 1). In the former two, states are likely to win in the 
                                            
14 Ibid., 6. 
15 Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and 
Settlement, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), 152‒5. 
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short term, whereas in the latter two strategies, conflict favors the weak in the 
long term. 16 
The direct approaches target the armed forces of an adversary to end its 
fighting capability while the indirect approach aims to finish its will to fight.17 
“Strong actors lose asymmetric conflicts when they adopt the wrong strategy vis-
à-vis their weaker adversaries. Same-approach interactions whether direct-direct 
or indirect-indirect favor strong actors because they imply shared values, aims, 
and victory conditions.”18 Moreover, delays and reverses in the process will 
finally encourage a conflict weary public or elites to force the state leadership to 
abandon the fight.19 Generally, terrorists follow indirect approaches, whereas 
states choose to follow direct approaches, and that works well for terrorists. 
 
Figure 1.  Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict 
Outcomes, expected winners in cells.20 
From Arreguín-Toft’s perspective  following the wrong approach or 
strategic interaction may lead a state to end up in a stalemate with an opponent. 
                                            
16 Ivan Arreguín-Toft  “How the Weak Win Wars ” International Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 
104‒109. 
17 Ibid., 104,105. 
18 Ibid., 121. 
19 Ibid., 97. 
20 Ibid., 108. 
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For an effective solution the state should come up with the same strategy as that 
of its opponent. Employing all of the states’ resources and institutions as part of a 
grand strategy must be the precondition of overcoming the adversary for ending 
its will to fight rather than only using military means to end the adversary’s 
fighting capability.21 It is this perspective that informs the hypotheses on 
strategies. 
Ben Connable and Martin Libicki in How Insurgencies End claim that 
according to their qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency cases, modern 
insurgencies last ten years on average. Their study describes four types of 
outcomes (Government loss, Government victory, Mixed type, Inconclusive or 
Ongoing outcome).  n a mixed type outcome they counter the idea of Zartman’s 
claim about stalemates providing critical opportunities for negotiated settlements. 
They claim such stalemates seldom occur, and when they do, such conflicts 
typically end due to physical, material, or political exhaustion. Exhaustion only 
plays the role of catalyst in the path of negotiation, victory, defeat or hibernation. 
External support, presence of safe havens and sanctuaries are positively 
correlated with the duration and success of the endgame for the insurgency.22 
“The total absence of sanctuary leaves insurgents with only a one-in-seven 
chance of winning (out of decided cases).”23 These notions of external events 
and external support underlie hypothesis three. 
 n “Things Fall  part: The Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Gordon 
McCormick, Steven Horton and Lauren Harrison focus on the ending internal 
conflicts. Contrary to common sense, they claim that more than 80 percent of 
internal conflicts were resolved by force. There are three main outcomes of 
conflicts: a win by a state, a win by the insurgency, or an effective stalemate that 
constrains both sides with limited maneuver space and neither side with a 
                                            
21 Ibid., 99,100. 
22 Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2010), 14, 15, 18, 19. 
23 Ibid., 36. 
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dominant advantage over the other. They categorize win types as weak and 
strong, in which a strong win requires pushing an opponent to its breakpoint 
besides effective control over the political space, whereas the former represents 
pushing an opponent under the breakpoint but unable to extend its control over 
the political space. The main paradigm of this type conflict is its asymmetrical 
structure. Although the state has the power advantage, the insurgency has 
invisibility because of its small size. The states and insurgencies approach their 
breaking points in very different ways: states pass the tipping point and decline at 
an accelerating rate, but insurgencies, by contrast, decline at a decelerating rate 
(Figure 2).24 The key for unlocking the endgame paradigm is turning the tide of 
information to one’s advantage, and understanding that it shouldn’t  e expected 
a quick and decisive solution against terrorism cases. The terrorist organizations’ 
breakpoints are curve shaped; it requires time, patience and resources for states 
to overcome this difficulty. 
 
Figure 2.  Endgames for state (A) and insurgency (B).25 
 n “How Terrorist Groups End” Seth Jones and Martin Li icki claim that 
there are five major reasons why terrorist groups end: policing, military force, 
                                            
24 Gordon H. McCormick  Steven B. Horton  and Lauren  . Harrison  “Things Fall  part: The 
Endgame Dynamics of  nternal Wars ” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (March 2007): 321‒327.  
25 Ibid., 327. 
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splintering, politics or victory. In their summary, they conclude there are two 
effective end ways for terrorist groups: They adopt nonviolent tactics and join the 
political process, or they are overcome by law enforcement agencies. According 
to the results of their survey of 268 cases, in 43 percent of the cases terrorists 
adopt nonviolent tactics and join the political process.26 The groups using 
terrorism may end with politicization as a way of achieving their goals due to fact 
that their members view nonviolent political means as a more effective way of 
achieving their goals.27 So, the connection between politicization and stalemates 
should be examined closely. In most of the cases the perception of the stalemate 
between sides may lead terrorists to engage politics, and it is proper to claim that 
politicization partly takes root from the stalemate. 
For political solutions used by terrorist groups, Jones and Libicki point out 
two major facts. The narrower the terrorist organizations’ goals  the more likely it 
is the outcome could be an agreement on a settlement; the broader their goals, 
the more difficult it is for terrorists to reach these aims, and they are more 
unlikely to seek a nonviolent resolution. As Figure 3 shows most terrorist groups 
end due to narrow policy goals such as policy change or regime change, 
whereas when they broaden their policy goals, as seen on the right of the x-axis, 
they are not likely to end because of politics.28 Therefore, the narrower goals of 
terrorist organizations may emerge as enticing opportunities for both sides, 
whereas the broader goals may lead sides to costly hurting stalemates. In that 
context, for the PKK case, it is easier to understand why their goals started at the 
far right in the 1990s, but over time in the 2000s moved to the left. 
                                            
26 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al 
Qa’ida (Santa Monica  C : R ND Corporation  2008)  9‒36. 
27 Ibid., 14. 
28 Ibid., 20‒21. 
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Figure 3.  Politics and Group Goals.29 
  
                                            
29 Ibid., 19. 
 12 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 13 
II. STALEMATE: THEORY AND CONDITIONS 
This thesis tries to understand under which conditions and circumstances 
parties may feel themselves to be in stalemated situations. William Zartman’s 
Theory of Ripeness handles this question by exploring why and when stalemates 
arise.30 In the light of this original model  the writer’s reinterpreted version of the 
Ripeness Model will be discussed as the basis for the structural argument of the 
PKK case.  
This chapter introduces the reader to the author’s reinterpretation of the 
Ripeness Model. First, the core elements of the original theory will be discussed 
through the reinterpreted model. Second, some major criticisms and 
counterviews about the original theory will be focused on. Third, independent 
variables will be explored, and finally, an expected utility approach will be 
examined in order to understand the logical base of the Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate phenomenon. 
There are two main approaches to the study and practice of negotiated 
conflicts: one deals with the substances of the proposals for the solution part, 
and the other handles the timing element.31 The focus of this thesis is timing 
element, and according to it sides resolve their conflict only when they are ready 
to do so. When the parties’ unilateral strategies of achieving their expected 
outcomes are blocked, and they find themselves in a costly and uncomfortable 
situation, they are more likely to recalculate the solution proposals that were 
already in the air, and previously ignored.32  
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The Theory of Ripeness addresses the timing and initiation elements of 
negotiations.33 The Theory of Ripeness is also concerned with the thought 
processes of decision makers looking for negotiation or mediation.34    
A. A REINTERPRETED THEORY OF RIPENESS 
The reinterpreted theory expands the original theory’s framework with the 
addition of the Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEOs) to the model. From a 
deductive perspective, the final point of the decision to negotiate35 will be 
explored by illuminating the concept and preconditions of ripeness. The 
expanded model is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  The Reinterpreted Ripeness Model.36 
In the first part of the model, the elements of ripeness, the MHS, the sense 
of a way out and the MEOs, are located as dependent variables, and the 
independent variables are the cost benefit analysis of resources, political wills, 
strategies and external developments. In the original model, Zartman claims 
persuasion and the objective elements as independent variables of a MHS.37 In 
the updated model, the MEOs concept of Mitchell and Crocker38 are imported to 
the model as one other way of seizing the ripe moment with or without an MHS.  
In the second part, elements of ripeness function as independent variables 
of a negotiation decision. The MEOs can also trigger the decision to negotiate 
                                            
36 The reinterpreted model created in the light of the original model of William Zartman with 
the addition of the concept of Mutually Enticing Opportunities of Mitchell and Crocker. The 
objective elements and persuasion factor in Zartman’s original model converted to more overt 
variables. 
37 Zartman  “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond ” 229  230. 
38 Mitchell  “Cutting Losses ” 2. 
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independent from the other two ripeness elements.  n Zartman’s original model 
the MEOs and the decision to negotiate are independent variables of a 
successful negotiation,39 but the updated model argues that the MEOs can play 
a role in a decision to negotiate outcome rather than a successful negotiation. 
The MEOs are subject to being affected by the initial preconditions of the MHS’, 
instead of the pessimistic judgment of the costs of the initial independent 
variables, actors can assess their opportunities in an optimistic fashion. 
Therefore, the initial independent variables, especially the political will or any 
other beneficial prizes both for individual and institutional levels, may generate 
the right conditions to lead a negotiation decision for sides as emerging MEOs. 
In the reinterpreted model, the MEOs are accepted as the third variable of 
ripeness. According to Zartman, an MHS is a negative, “pushing” element that 
forces parties to take a decision to negotiate. At that point, in order to reach a 
more stable, more attractive and long-lasting future settlement, the MEOs may 
take part in the process as a “pulling” element.40 Supporting this, Mitchell argues 
that extended pain cannot be the only or the best learning experience for 
decision makers or leaders. They may find more effective ways of learning than 
mutual hurting stalemates for achieving their goals.41 That is why the MEOs can 
play a replacement or a reinforcing role in either the lack or the presence of an 
MHS as an independent variable of the final outcome of negotiating.  
The ME s’ logic is  ased on a more optimistic approach of leaders to 
conflict with new options that cost less and offer more likely gains. It suggests 
that leaders can change their mindsets and act more creatively for better 
alternatives than deadlocked coercive preferences. The major rewards can be 
political results for future leadership, some electoral results, or expectations of a 
share in political power. In the case of the Basque conflict, for instance, a 
                                            
39 Zartman  “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond ” 242. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Mitchell  “Cutting Losses ” 2. 
 17 
decentralized shared political system became the result of a negotiation 
process.42 
Ripeness is not a magical solution to resolve the conflicts. It is necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition for disputes to settle with a negotiated outcome.43 
By itself, ripeness is not enough for negotiations to begin. Sometimes 
negotiations may be a result of a tactical maneuver, a breather for rest and 
rearmament, a stop to external pressure, without any serious or sincere intent for 
negotiations.44  
Furthermore, ripeness is a subjective phenomenon. The subjectivity or 
perceptions of each side can become persuasive with the objective indicators of 
the MHS, and the parties may feel a way out from the situation.45 An example 
could be the sudden increase in the casualty numbers in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
War between Armenia and Azerbaijan that led both sides to ceasefire 
negotiations.46  
Ripeness is only a condition and it must be obtained either by the sides or 
by the persuasion of a third party or mediator.47 The mediators can position 
themselves in the process of turning ripe moments to negotiations by persuading 
sides with some specific tactics.48 
B. THREE CRITICISMS OF THEORY OF RIPENESS 
There are three major critiques to the ripeness theory. The first one is the 
ME s’ concept that pain is not the only exit from a deadlocked situation; some 
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positive incentives may lead sides to recalculate their approaches to problem.49 
Zartman overcomes this problem of integrating the MEOs into his model by 
claiming it is a precondition of a successful negotiation.50 By contrast, the 
updated model locates it as a ripeness element. 
The second problem is the issue of being trapped in the conflict. 
Entrapment is directly the opposite of ripeness; pain or losses may trap decision 
makers to continue the conflict.51 Instead of the idea to give up, both sides may 
justify the fight and sacrifices that have already been suffered, and hope to win in 
the end in order to validate previous losses.52 Zartman accepts that kind of an 
approach, but he claims a major catastrophe might change the decision makers’ 
willingness to continue to fight.53 Norms, cultural values and beliefs may affect 
the society’s tolerance or perception of entrapment.54 For instance, it is sacred to 
resist and endure against the sanctions or the West for leaders and society in 
Iran.55 Similarly, the Asian cultures have a high level of commitment to conflicts, 
and it is hard to seize a ripe moment for a resolution. Terrorism cases are similar; 
it is not easy for states to give up or negotiate with terrorists despite high levels of 
losses and sacrifices.  
The last critique of the Theory of Ripeness is that it lacks a political 
dimension; that it is  ased heavily on the leader’s decision-making process; and 
it neglects the internal political processes which overrides or substitutes the 
leader’s decision making.56 Besides leaders, the stakeholders of decision 
mechanisms should be taken into consideration. Both for the terrorists and 
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55 Morteza Dehghani et al.  “Emerging Sacred Values:  ran’s Nuclear  rogram ” in Judgment 
and Decision Making, Vol 4 (7) (2009): 930–933. 
56  ruitt  “Whither Ripeness Theory ” 22. 
 19 
states, some collective approaches may affect the final decision to continue or 
give up. The reinterpreted model aims to overcome this problem by integrating 
political will into the model. The stakeholders and their positioning will be 
discussed in the case study. 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In this part the independent variables of ripeness will be discussed. 
According to the thesis, independent variables are the cost benefit analysis of 
resources, political wills, strategies and external developments.  
1. Strategies 
There are many variables that affect the conflict management processes, 
and the strategies are the most significant ones. The strategies play a major role 
and determine the outcomes of the conflicts. The correct strategy may produce 
desired outcomes, whereas the wrong strategies may generate stalemates or 
losses. There are five different types of strategies for approaching conflicts: 
contending, problem solving, compromise yielding, withdrawing and inaction.57 In 
terrorism cases sides generally prefer contending strategies.  
Contending refers to a party’s unilateral efforts to resolve the conflict  y 
dictating its own terms no matter what the other party seeks.58 By contrast, 
problem solving requires a mutual effort for identifying the disputed issues and 
working together towards a solution that appeals to both sides.59 But, at initial 
stages of terrorism cases, it is unlikely to accept a problem solving approach 
from the point of either side. After a stalemate situation such an approach can be 
considered as an option, and a shift in strategy towards a problem solving 
approach may occur.  
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Stalemates occur when contentious strategies fail.60 At that point, other 
than contentious strategies, the most attractive strategy to follow is problem 
solving by first creating contact and communication, and second by preparing 
some subordinate goals that the adversaries could work on together to create a 
mutual understanding and trust rather than a debate.61 That is not to say both 
sides should approach the conflict with a problem solving approach. 
One problem is the way states handle the contending strategies. From 
one perspective, instead of annihilation as a goal achieved by seizing the 
opponent’s territory and resources, destroying its military forces and ending its 
control over the population, states may follow exhaustion strategy that will defeat 
the opposition by forcing its political leadership to quit.62 In most cases the 
problem with counterterrorism strategies is that they are not supported with a 
grand strategy built on the idea of the second approach. They aim to defeat 
terrorist organizations by only military means that are not supported by some 
other instruments of the state. 
2. Resources 
Resources can be economics, time, lives, external support and safe 
havens. Exhaustion of resources can be defined as the physical or psychological 
loss of energy to sustain the conflicts.63  
First, the major cost of conflict is the financial losses parties experience. 
Although terrorist attacks are cheap to conduct, logistically sustaining an 
organization is costly and requires money. On the other hand, counterterrorism 
measures require huge investments.64  
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Second, time works on behalf of terrorists. They will be the source of the 
problem and the problem gets bigger and insurmountable as long as they 
survive. It is hard for terrorist organizations to push states to their breaking 
points; therefore, remaining in the struggle and protracting the conflict over time 
is one way of leading their struggle to a stalemated outcome. Especially for the 
terrorist organizations, such as the PKK, who are ethnically oriented and aiming 
to get some policy changes, territorial claim, or sovereignty, the best-value 
outcome is a stalemated situation in which a third party or mediator addition to 
the process may produce some concessions on their behalf in the long run. 
Third, the casualties suffered on both sides show the objective pain of the 
struggle that may lead adversaries to recalculate the cost benefit analysis and 
reconsider the situation.65  
3. External Developments 
The external support, regional rivalries and developments may change the 
direction of unequal power and information asymmetry on behalf of either party. 
State sponsorship or safe heavens are the most likely form of external support 
for terrorists. The international support a state gains against a terrorist 
organization provides narrative superiority, international cooperation, and 
information dominance for the state and leads to isolation of the terrorist 
organization. On the other hand, terrorists may extend the life span and threshold 
of their organization by gaining sanctuaries and external support.  
4. Political Will 
The political will to sustain the conflicts depends on internal dynamics 
such as the level of public support and changes in leaders.  
Political support is a major component of a conflict, and the loss of it may 
lead a side to abandon the conflict or revise their goals or means that are used.66 
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The loss of popular support may trigger internal political outcomes ranging from 
protests to electoral results. The policy makers’ decisions may be shaped 
according to the support they get from their public. From the terrorist 
organizations’ point of view, political support is the backbone of their struggle. 
Terrorist organizations are successful only if they succeed in influencing and 
getting their targeted audience’s support.  
Change in leadership itself, in some instances, also provides sides with 
the ability to seize a ripe moment. A new leader may abandon the predecessor’s 
failed policies more easily, so that change costs less in political terms. He can 
have some space to maneuver for building his own policies, and as a newcomer 
to the problem he may have a deeper understanding or fresh outlook.67 Yitzak 
Rabin in Israel and Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union were some examples 
of new leaders who made efforts to seize the moment of ripeness.68  
Discord within the political sphere may also affect the decision 
mechanisms. From a state perspective a coalition government is less likely to 
follow a consensus. Especially in stalemated situations, more hawkish 
approaches might be accepted. From a terrorists’ perspective the same 
disagreements may result in weakness and a lower level of resistance, and more 
frequently, in splintering. 
All these preconditions are interrelated; success or failure in one affects 
others. The crucial point is the cost benefit analysis of the sides, which depends 
on whether adversaries are in MHS or MEOs frames.  
D. AN EXPECTED UTILITY APPROACH TO STALEMATES 
Terrorist organizations act rationally no matter how irrational terrorism 
might seem at first. Leaders, for both sides, calculate the expected utilities for 
their outcomes. The essence of the expected utility approach is to calculate the 
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costs and benefits of some available options and their probabilities, and finally 
reach an optimal course of action according to these calculations.69 Therefore, in 
a stalemated situation, costs may cause the abandonment of existing policies, or 
benefits may lose their attraction. The expected utility may be redefined with the 
addition of the costs and benefits that have already been experienced to the 
equation as current benefits and costs. This calculation of benefits and costs is 
represented by the following models (where B1 and B3 are current benefits; C1 
and C3 are current costs; B2, B4 and C2, C4 are future benefits and costs, p2: 
probability of state benefit to happen and 0<p2<1, and p4: probability of terrorists 
benefit to happen and 0<p4<1). 
EU (State)=(B1-C1)+(p2*B2-[1-p2]*C2) 
EU (Terrorist Organization)=(B3-C3)+(p4*B4-[1-p4]*C4) 
Current benefits and costs (B1, C1 for the state, and B3, C3 for the 
terrorist organization) at the time affect the future expectations in two ways. 
In the first condition, if the current cost-benefit analysis is negative (B1-
C1<0 or B3-C3<0 the first parts of the models), the parties are in the losing 
frame;70 and (a) it may cause parties to commit themselves more to cause, but 
(b) if the losing portion is big in scale, both sides may start reevaluating the 
situation and go for a reconciliation strategy. The former case is called an 
entrapment, or a true believer problem, in which the pain or the losses already 
suffered justify and push the sides to commit even more.71 It may be also 
considered a pro lem within Zartman’s model. He explains this pro lem with his 
first proposition that ripeness is necessary but not a sufficient condition by itself 
for negotiations to begin. Therefore, in such conditions sometimes an MHS 
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makes opening negotiations more difficult.72 In the latter situation parties may 
start to perceive a stalemate. If the current cost-benefit analysis is more negative, 
then the second part, the marginal cost benefit analysis, comes into evaluation in 
the equation. The possibilities of future costs and benefits (C2, C4 and B2, B4), 
which we may call marginal values, may generate a positive mood so that both 
sides may continue to follow their policies. If the marginal part is also negative in 
the minds of both sides, then both sides are more likely to feel a stalemate and to 
abandon the current policies. 
In the second condition, if the current cost-benefit analysis is positive (B1-
C1>0 or B3-C3>0), the parties are in the winning frame.73 They will be more 
likely to follow their current policies in the case that the marginal part seems 
positive to both sides. They may increase their endeavors to win the struggle. On 
the other hand, if they expect a negative future outcome they can either continue 
or change their means and goals according to their private information and the 
signals they receive from the other side. 
It is useful to evaluate how parties may end up in a stalemate in this 
simple expected utility model. Arguably, terrorism cases present pure zero sum 
games and that states’ losses are terrorist organizations’ gains or vice versa. 
Therefore, the likelihood of a stalemate is hard to reach and paradoxical. This is 
why both sides’ perceptual perspectives differ and ripeness is a subjective 
phenomenon that is often hard to realize.  
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III. THE TURKISH-PKK CONFLICT AND ITS COMPONENTS 
A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
In the last few decades, instead of focusing on a broader international 
agenda, Turkey has used much of its resources to overcome a separatist terrorist 
organization, the PKK.74  
The PKK, established in 1978, started its armed campaign in 1984.75 
Even though the PKK tries to position itself as the sole representative of the 
Kurds and claims itself as a guerrilla organization, it lacks the Kurdish public’s 
support.76 Around 40,000 people, officials and civilians, lost their lives. According 
to a government report the direct overall cost of    ’s terror in Turkey is around 
300 billion dollars, whereas indirect cost is estimated around one trillion dollars.77 
It is designated as a terrorist organization by not only Turkey, but also the U.S. 
and EU.78 It specializes in bloody financing methods and operates as a criminal 
transnational organization on a broad scale from human smuggling to drug 
trafficking.79 Throughout its history, it enjoyed the support of state sponsorship 
and safe havens that local power vacuums provided.  
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First, the scale of the threat should be examined. The PKK must be 
named as a global threat rather than a local problem of Turkey. Although it is 
internationally accepted as a terrorist organization, the cooperation level against 
it is arguably low. Figure 5 is a depiction of the terrorist organizations on a 
periodic table by Navanti Group, and it provides a better understanding of the 
scope and level at which they function. The chart presents information about the 
acronyms, sizes, locations, ages, activity levels and attacks of terrorist 
organizations. The PKK, from whatever perspective one evaluates this chart, with 




Figure 5.  The Periodic Table of Terrorist Groups.80 
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Second, there are issues that the southeastern part of Turkey has faced 
for years, such as social, economic, and security problems. The PKK is one of 
the major reasons and sources of these problems. Every step the state takes for 
solving these problems has been subject to sabotage and disruption by the 
PKK.81 For example, they killed teachers and clerics, set fire to construction 
machines and schools, kidnapped workers and threatened businessmen, and 
damaged health centers, electricity lines, post offices and bridges.82 State 
investments to the southeastern part of the country have been consistently 
higher than the revenues gathered from there,83 no matter how the PKK tries to 
corrode those efforts.  
In the current situation, approximately 25 percent of the deputies in the 
Turkish National Assembly are of Kurdish origin,84 and it is a good representation 
when compared with an estimated 15 to 20 percent Kurdish population in 
Turkey.85 By law everyone is equal before the state, and any kind of ethnically-
oriented separatist thoughts are forbidden. The Turkish citizenship described by 
the constitution is the bonding element of the country. A new constitution is in 
progress, and there will be additional reforms on cultural and social issues in it. 
Turkey has such a strong democracy that there are some PKK-affiliated 
deputies of Kurdish origin who do not condemn the    ’s  loody attacks or call 
the PKK terrorists, but rather warriors and freedom fighters.86 These deputies 
use their freedom of speech at the highest level in the National Assembly. 
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Moreover, the steps and reforms that have been taken to qualify for EU 
membership are well beyond expectations, although the reform effort has lost its 
pace in recent years.  
The aim of the PKK terrorist organization was originally to establish a 
Marxist-Leninist independent Kurdish state by using Maoist guerrilla warfare 
tactics.87 However, it could not find many communists in the tribal God-fearing 
Kurdish community. Over time, PKK has modified its aims and strategies 
according to the needs of each period’s internal and external dynamics. Rather 
than following an ideological Marxist-Leninist path to survive, especially after the 
fall of Soviet regime, the PKK focused on the religious and ethnic sentiments of 
its target population.88 Their main grievance was their perceived threat to Kurdish 
identity.89 Their updated goals ranged from the release or home arrest of their 
imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan,90 to cultural and political rights in a separate 
state or a federative structure for Kurds.91 
On the other hand, the counter narrative of Turkey is that the integrity and 
the unitary structure of the state cannot be jeopardized under any 
circumstances.92 The PKK is a separatist terrorist organization, and it does not 
represent the Kurdish community in Turkey. The goal is the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of    ’s members.93  
The majority of the Kurds in Turkey want to move toward a more modern 
and democratic Turkey, and they want to turn to the West in Turkey’s unity  not 
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the East, or the bloodshed that the Middle East offers.94 They are well aware of 
the separatist threat PKK poses for the country, and they remember the bloody 
history of the PKK. Approximately half of the Turkish Kurds are living in the 
southeastern part of the country; the other half live dispersed and blended within 
the society on the western side of the country.95 One major obstacle in front of 
the    ’s unlikely goal of an independent state is the integration of the Turkish 
Kurds into society countrywide.  
During the initial stages of their armed campaign, the PKK killed many 
Kurds in the southeastern part of Turkey in order to establish their presence; it 
also eliminated rival Kurdish structures by coercive and violent means.96 At the 
same time, the PKK enjoyed support from Turkey’s neigh oring states’ such as 
Greece, Syria, and Iran.97 PKK played the roles the regional rivals of Turkey 
wanted them to fulfill. Therefore, Turkey’s relations with its neigh ors are mainly 
based on the support that they provide to the PKK. 
Similar to its diverse source of support, PKK has a heterogeneous 
organizational structure; it has recruits not only from the Kurdish communities of 
Turkey but also Syria, Iraq, Iran and Europe.98 This international dimension 
makes the pro lem’s resolution more complicated. 
   ’s history can  e evaluated in two major parts; the first phase starts 
with its armed attacks in the 1980s and ends with the capture of its leader, 
Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999. In the first phase, the PKK established its 
organizational capacity and started its armed campaign. In the 1990s, its 
violence reached its peak, and counterterrorism efforts ended this phase with the 
capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999. There was a nonviolent period between 
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1999 and 2004. The second stage started in 2004, and it has continued until 
now. Especially in the 1990s and 2000s there were some turning points that 
could be considered as stalemates which will be discussed later. 
B. STAKEHOLDERS OF THE PKK PROBLEM 
For the PKK case, one important element that should be taken into 
consideration is the stakeholders and decision-making mechanisms involved in 
the pro lem.  ll stakeholders’ approaches to the PKK problem determine the 
power balance in the equation. The cost-benefit analysis of the strategies, 
resources, political will and external developments are under the influence of 
these actors’ actions and intentions. Therefore, a perceived stalemate could be a 
consequence of these actors’ dynamic relations. For instance, as long as the 
external support and the safe havens exist the    ’s life span is likely to be 
extended. These political actors can be considered on three levels: the 
institutions, the individuals who lead those institutions, and the external parties. 
Institutional change in policies is hard to bring about, but changing individuals in 
power over time may produce shifts in approaches. 
1. National Security Council (MGK) 
The NSC (MGK) is the highest-level decision making mechanism of the 
Turkish State. National policies concerning both regional and global challenges 
and opportunities are subject to discussion and responses considered by the 
Council. Under the chairmanship of the President, the Council includes the Prime 
Minister, the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, Deputy Prime Ministers, 
the Ministers of Justice, National Defense, the Interior and Foreign Affairs, the 
Commanders of the Land, Naval and Air Forces and the General Commander of 
the Gendarmerie. According to the agenda, concerned ministers and individuals 
can also be invited to the meetings of the Council for consultations.99 
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2. Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) 
The TAF is one of the biggest armies in the world with its 623,351 
personnel.100 It is one of the main components of the decision-making 
mechanism of the Turkish State. Historically, military leaders are major actors in 
state decisions. They play critical roles in developing civil leaders’ decisions 
regarding security-related problems. TAF is the major force for conducting 
counterterrorism efforts of the state. The idea of dialogue or negotiation with 
terrorists goes against the raison d’etre of the TAF.101 The military’s focus is 
more on building a grand strategy to overcome the PKK threat that is supported 
not only by the security but also the social and economic dimensions. 
3. National Intelligence Agency (MIT) 
The MIT is the information and intelligence domain of the state, and it also 
provides back channel communications. Some covert contacts were made with 
the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan by means of the MIT in 2000s. The MIT played the 
representative role of the state in discussions with the    ’s actors. 
Respectively, first Emre Taner and later Hakan Fidan took part in the 
negotiations with PKK as the head of MIT.102 
4. Presidency 
Although the presidency is the head of the state, the position is more 
symbolic than functional in the decision process. Due to fact that presidents are 
generally nominated by major political parties, and elected especially with the 
ruling party’s support  they are not likely to contradict with governing party 
policies.    
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5. Ruling Parties 
Ruling parties’ roles depend on the power they hold in the Parliament. 
Especially in the 1990s, coalition governments were power-sharing structures 
that mainly followed the military’s guidance for approaching the PKK problem. 
But since 2002, the Justice and Democracy Party (AKP) has held control of the 
government. In that 12-year period until now, it has won three general and three 
local elections and two constitutional referendums by highly increased margins. 
In the last local elections AKP took 45 percent of the votes.103 Therefore, for 
policy building the AKP has the self-sufficient public support and chairs in the 
assembly. The leader of the party is Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the party owes 
its reputation to him. There is a huge capacity for AKP and its leader, Erdogan, 
for approaching the PKK problem from any perspective to use hard or soft 
means.  
6. Opposing Parties 
In Turkey, within the context of PKK terrorism, other than the PKK-linked 
Kurdish party, all parties traditionally agree that military means offer the best way 
to handle the PKK problem.104 Negotiating with terrorists is heavily criticized. 
One major promise of the opposing parties to their voters during elections is 
terminating the terrorism threat. 
7. Media 
The media plays a critical role for shaping public opinion on disputed 
issues. It can be a useful tool for leading people in desired directions. The media 
can be arguably manipulative on behalf of or against an issue. Since stalemate is 
a perceived reality, the media can play a role in creating the public perception of 
a stalemate towards a negotiation process. The media in Turkey could be 
considered of in three broad categories: published media, the visual media, and 
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the Internet and interactive social media. The second and third types of media 
are the most influential ones. The easiest way to reach people is visual media 
since every house has a television. Internet usage in Turkey is also increasing 
and can be important platform for creating public opinion.  
8. Kurdish Political Parties 
Since 1991, Kurds in Turkey have taken part in political life with ethnicity-
based agendas, and they could not have successfully integrated themselves into 
politics independently from the PKK. Ocalan spoke out in support of those 
parties, since they were acting as the mouth of the PKK in the Parliament. 
Respectively the  urdish  eople’s La or  arty (HE )  Democracy  arty (DE )  
 eople’s Democracy  arty (H DE )  Democratic  eople  arty (DEH  ) and 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) were all banned for the same reasons: violating 
the constitution and the law on the political parties, having links with the PKK, 
and following separatist agendas.105 The current Kurdish party is the Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP) and it is still operating in the National Assembly, though 
it is on the same pathway as its predecessors. 
9. Abdullah Ocalan 
Ocalan is the founder and undisputable head of the organization. Even 
though he has been the symbol of Kurdish nationalism to PKK supporters, he is 
the son of a Kurdish father, but a Turkish mother. His main language (mother 
tongue) is Turkish and he is reported to have only a rudimentary command of 
Kurdish.106 There is no collective decision making for  calan’s    . Even 
though he has been imprisoned on Imrali Island since 1999, he is still the major 
actor and decision maker of the PKK. In the history of the terrorist organization, 
he eliminated anyone he considered a rival to himself.107 After 15 years of 
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imprisonment, though, his leadership of the PKK has not been replaced; 
however, it can be claimed that the 1990s’ and 2000s’  calan differs in mentality 
and style. Since a change in his jail conditions or a home arrest has created as 
an enticing opportunity, Ocalan is more moderate about a negotiation and ending 
armed campaign. 
Other than Ocalan, Murat Karayilan, Cemil Bayik, Duran Kalkan and 
Adem Uzun are the influential actors for the PKK in their Kandil headquarters.108 
Remzi Kartal and Sabri Ok are important European front actors.109 Especially 
after Ocalan, Karayilan has led the PKK as an operational head. In 2013, Bayik 
became the new second man behind Ocalan. Bayik is from the hawkish wing of 
the PKK and is speculated to have close links with Iran.110 This change could be 
read as a message of Ocalan to the latest negotiation process to deliver more 
concrete results. 
10. Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (KCK, Koma Ciwaken 
Kurdistan) 
The KCK was a new organizational format for the PKK. It is a social 
agreement that arose in 2005 when Abdullah Ocalan ordered his lawyers to 
develop for the PKK an alternative confederative umbrella system to the existing 
Turkish state.111 It was also a call for the other regions’  urds, respectively in 
Iraq, Syria, and Iran, to meet in a confederative system.112 It was first introduced 
to    ’s sympathizers in the Nevrouz of 2005 as the Kurdistan Democratic 
Confederalism (KKK, Koma Komalen Kurdistan), but later its name changed to 
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KCK.113 KCK consists of leadership (Ocalan), a legislative branch (KONGRA-
GEL   urdistan  eople’s Congress)  an executive organ (KCK Executive 
Council), and committees (such as those on education, health, science, culture, 
economy, ecology etc.)114 The operations that started in April 2009 against KCK 
disrupted the    ’s ur an structure and put the organization in a difficult 
situation.115     
11. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) 
The NGOs in Turkey are generally connected with Kurdish issues and act 
like front organizations of the PKK. Human rights organizations, especially, 
strongly connected to the PKK. Most of the more than 600 NGOs’ individuals and 
associations gathered under the banner of the Democratic People Congress 
(DTK) in 2008.116 “ t is led  y BD  politicians and  acks some  C  policies  
often holds its meetings in BD   uildings and is influenced  y    .”117 
On the other hand, some economic NGOs such as the Turkish 
Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and Muslim Businessmen’s Association 
(MUSIAD) played crucial roles economically in the development of the southeast 
part of Turkey throughout history. But their attempts, though supported by the 
state’s incentives  could not produce the desired outcomes due to the    ’s 
coercive tactics against entrepreneurs in the region.118 
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12. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) 
Barzani and Talabani led two major parties of the Northern Iraq Kurdish 
Administration, the KDP and PUK historically became the major stakeholders of 
the PKK problem. Although they claim not to support directly the PKK, even their 
inaction has given passive support to the PKK and provided vast maneuvering 
space in Northern Iraq. Although PUK/KDP have different agendas and have had 
some friction between them, dealing with the PKK problem is not a priority for 
them. Instead, increasing economic relations with Turkey is important and makes 
them part of the PKK issue. 
During the 1990s  Turkey feared that  urdistan Regional Government’s 
(KRG) autonomous structure would increase separatists’ thoughts in Turkey. 
However, in the 2000s, that fear of an independent Kurdish structure in Northern 
Iraq went unrealized in the face of increasing energy-based cooperation. 
Approximately 1,023 Turkish firms operate in  RG’s territory  and Turkey and the 
KRG agreed to build one gas and two oil pipelines that would bypass the 
Baghdad-controlled Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline in May 2012.119 That increased 
cooperation and created mutually enticing opportunities that changed the position 
of KRG, and it can indirectly push the PKK to quit its armed campaign.  
13. The European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) 
As described previously, the two actors recognize the PKK as a terrorist 
organization. Since Turkey is following the EU membership process, especially 
after the 1999 Helsinki Summit in which Turkey’s full mem ership period started  
the PKK problem has always been an obstacle in front of Turkey.120 The EU 
focuses on the human right issues related to the Kurds and also the conduct of 
counterterrorism strategies in Turkey, but the terrorism produced by the PKK and 
                                            
119 Emanuella Pergolizzi  “ n Uncertain Road to  eace: Domestic and Regional Challenges 
In the Turkish- urdish  rocess ” Istituto Affari Internazionali Working Papers 13, no. 18 (June 
2013):8. 
120 Gunes Murat Tezcur  “When Democratization Radicalizes: The  urdish Nationalist 
Movement in Turkey ” Journal of Peace Research 47, no.6 (2010):778. 
 37 
the expanded rights for the Kurds should not be mixed with and evaluated on the 
same grounds. The cultural and social precautions are considered as necessary 
steps for Turkey to take not only for the Kurdish community but also everybody in 
Turkey. Between 1999 and 2004, eight major constitutional amendments were 
enacted by Turkish government.121  
These reform packages abolished the death penalty; liberalized the 
political parties, press, and associations laws; improved 
imprisonment and custody regulations; facilitated broadcasting and 
education in languages other than Turkish (i.e., Kurdish); 
recognized the legal standing of the European Court of Human 
Rights; increased civilian control over the military; reduced the 
scope of the military courts; abolished the State Security Courts; 
extended greater rights to non-Muslim minorities; and revoked a 
highly restrictive sentence of the Anti-Terror Law. Given all these 
developments, Freedom House assigned Turkey a score of 3 for 
both political rights and civil liberties in 2004 (on a scale of 1 to 7; 1 
 eing most democratic). Turkey’s score had  een 4 for political 
rights and 5 for civil liberties in 1999.122  
The pace of reform had diminished by the time the PKK renewed its 
campaign of violence after 2004. The EU stands as an opportunity for Turkey’s 
long-lived dreams of being a member. It can play a role as long as it provides the 
right and fair judgments from Turkey’s point of approaching     terror. Leaving 
aside the PKK, Turkey has the capability and desire to protect and expand its 
Turkish  urds’ living standards. 
In the U.S.-Turkey context, Turkey is one of the major strategic partners of 
U.S. in the region. Even though in some periods there were some policy 
differences and some high tensions, they are historical partners. It can be argued 
that Turkey’s importance for the U.S. diminished by the end of Cold War, but new 
developments in the Middle East have proved the geographic importance of 
Turkey.123  
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The U.S.-led War on Terror has had some crucial consequences for the 
definition of the PKK case. The PKK was internationally recognized as a terrorist 
organization. But the First Gulf War and the Iraq War created a safe haven for 
the PKK in the Northern Iraq. The U.S. search for stability in Iraq after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein provided an historic opportunity for Iraqi Kurds to reach a 
semiautonomous structure on the road to an independent state.  
From another perspective, the PKK’s terrorism is a great opportunity for 
the U.S. to show that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam. In recent years, 
there is an increased anti-Americanism in Turkey,124 so support in Turkey’s 
struggle with the PKK might be one way of building trust, showing sincerity and 
increasing cooperation in the eyes of the Turkish people. The model of 
democracy and a strong partnership that the U.S. seeks in the region could be 
assured by the solid example of Turkey, but first the terrorism threat must be 
eliminated. Temporary cooperation is subject to an increased anti-Americanism 
since temporal actions not likely to produce permanent results. Therefore, 
cooperation towards a permanent solution might improve the U.S.’ image in 
Turkey. 125  
14. Syria/Iran 
Syria and Iran both have a significant Kurdish population. Although they 
consider the idea of an independent Kurdish state a threat to their own 
sovereignties, historically they have supported the PKK. PKK has long enjoyed 
state sponsorship by these countries. 
Syria was the first state to support the PKK on its soil. The PKK exploited 
the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for a long time. The initial growth 
of this terrorist organization had its roots in Syrian soil at the beginning of the 
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 1980s.126 Syria used the PKK issue as a bargaining chip against Turkey until 
1998 for its water problems related to the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and its 
historical Hatay province127 wishes.128  
In the beginning of the 2000s relations normalized between the two until 
the Arab Spring reached Syria. Turkey positioned itself against the Assad 
regime’s oppressive attacks on its people. The turmoil in Syria created a new 
opportunity for Syrian Kurds in 2011, and clashes increased in 2013 when a so-
called unilateral PKK ceasefire was announced. There is no doubt PKK members 
joined the fighting in Syria.129 From that perspective, the timing of that so-called 
unilateral ceasefire is illusive. 
Historically, Turkey and Iran are geographic rivals. The 1979 Revolution in 
Iran presents a counter narrative for not only Turkey’s secular model   ut also the 
Sunni countries’ interpretation of  slam. That is why the two non-Arab countries 
differ in their ideological and religious standpoints. The regional rivalry between 
the two countries was reshaped after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the new AKP 
government increased its political, security and economic relations with Iran.130 
Trade increased from $1 billion to $10 billion between 2000 and 2010, and it is 
projected to increase to $30 billion.131 The major area of trade is energy; after 
Russia, Iran is the second major provider of natural gas to Turkey, and 40 
percent of crude oil import comes from Iran.132 
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The Kurdish issue is one of the concerns the two countries share. Iran had 
supported the PKK until the PKK affiliate the Free Life and Party of Kurdistan 
(PJAK) started to operate on Iranian soil.133 After the PJAK threat, Turkey and 
Iran cooperated for a while. In the summer of 2010 the two increased intelligence 
sharing and cooperation about border security against the PKK, but those 
developments were cut back since the end of 2011.134 The domino effect of the 
Arab Spring fueled the race between Turkey and Iran over the control of the 
political space in Syria, and put them on different sides of the problem. In the 
current situation, Iran prefers the PKK to be a continued problem for Turkey due 
to their regional rivalry.135 The sudden and unexpected increase in the attacks of 
PKK in 2012, especially in the Semdinli District, could be explained by the 
deteriorated relations between Iran and Turkey after the Syrian unrest.136 
Turkey opposes a nuclear Iran, which might lead to an arms race and 
instability in the region, but it also objects to the idea of a military intervention 
against Iran due to past economic experiences of similar interventions in Iraq.137 
Therefore, Turkey might play a mediator role between Iran and the West. 
All these countries have sought a stable status quo for the sake of 
regional balance and territorial integrity after the Gulf War138 and the Iraq War139 
Iran, Syria, and Turkey had bilateral meetings about future possibilities for 
cooperation against the threat of an independent Kurdish political entity in the 
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area.140 But the recent developments have caused them to focus on their own 
priorities. Iran and Syria are allied in favor of  ssad’s regime; by contrast, Turkey 
backs the opposition.141 Violence is not likely to de-escalate for the near future, 
and Syria is already another example of a conflict area bringing on swarming 
terrorist organizations and instability to the region.  
C. FIRST PHASE: THE 1984‒1999 PERIOD 
Just before the military coup took place in Turkey in 1980, first Abdullah 
Ocalan, then his followers escaped to Syria.142 They increased the    ’s 
organizational capacity in a short time, and made their first armed attacks 
simultaneously in the Semdinli and Eruh districts in 1984.143  
In the first years of its armed campaign, the    ’s strategy focused on 
intimidating the local people and establishing its authority in the southeastern 
parts of the country.144 In some geographically remote mountainous areas, 
especially those close to the border, the PKK forced people to support them with 
logistics, and killed whoever countered them.145  calan’s tactic was a copy of 
Castro’s guerrilla warfare tactics; as Castro descended from Sierra Maestra to 
capture Havana in Cuba, Ocalan started by placing his armed men in the high 
mountains of the southeast and establishing his authority.146 They kidnapped 
children under the name of mandatory service to the organization. Some people 
started to escape from these fight zones and migrated to the west side of Turkey. 
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Those coercive tactics were alienating people from the organization rather than 
intimidating them into joining.147 
The state, in response to the    ’s coercive tactics, enabled locals to 
protect themselves and established a Village Guards System (VGS) in 1985. For 
years these locals fought against the PKK shoulder-to-shoulder with the military 
forces.148 The VGS showed the logical fallacy of the narrative of the PKK who 
claimed themselves as guerrilla fighters. That is why, even today, one of the 
   ’s priorities is the abolishment of the VGS.149 As a result of the    ’s 
violence against village guards, the number of village guards, doubled from 
16,000 in 1989 to 32,000 in 1993.150 
The state also declared the state of emergency (OHAL) in the 
southeastern side of the country in 1987. The increased powers of regional 
governors by OHAL aimed to combat the PKK more effectively and cut the 
supplies to the PKK.151 As a consequence some 3428 villages and hamlets were 
evacuated.152 Most of the hamlets were comprised of three to five houses 
sheltering 30 to 40 family members.153 In return, the PKK and its affiliates used 
these evacuations as propaganda and a disinformation campaign on human 
rights violations. Many of those people who had to evacuate their villages were 
later compensated by the state. In 2004, Turkey passed a law for Turkish Kurds 
who were displaced and victims of terrorism to be compensated for their losses. 
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One billion Euros were paid to 133,000 victims.154 Over 150,000 Turkish Kurds 
returned to their evacuated villages.155 
In the early 1990s PKK violence reached its peak, and Turkey in turn was 
forced to modify its tactics, techniques and technology.156 In particular, Turkey 
imported Cobra helicopters and new equipment, such as night vision and thermal 
cameras to provide superiority along with increased troop numbers in the 
region.157 Military units were rearranged based on the nature of the conflict, and 
police and gendarmerie units more actively participated in the fight.158 Hot pursuit 
and large cross-border operations of TAF left the PKK hopeless during the 
1990s159. Table 1 presents the major cross-border operations and their results. 
Under those conditions, Ocalan announced the first so-called unilateral ceasefire 
decision in 1993. Later, in 1995, 1998 and 1999 he announced a similar type of 
ceasefires. It is better to group the first two and the latter two calls together 
because of the similar conditions and reasons behind them. Between 1993 and 
1995 violence reached its peak with high casualties, and PKK needed time to 
reorganize for avoiding defeat. The 1998 and 1999’s calls were due to     and 
 calan’s sense of a boxed-in situation. Ocalan lost the support of Syria and tried 
to present himself as peace seeker, foreseeing his imminent capture. 
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16 SEPT‒7 NOV 
1992 1551 1232 28 125 
2 
DRAGON-1 
OPERATION 12‒23 APRIL 1994 146 Unknown 5 Unknown 
3 
HAKURK/DRAGON 
AND STEEL OPS. 
20 MAR‒2 MAY 
1995 555 13 64 185 
4 
DRAGON-2 
OPERATION 05‒11 JULY 1995 204 89 21   
5 OPERATION HAMMER  
14 MAY‒26 JUNE 
1997 2730 415 114 338 
6 OPERATION DAWN 
25 SEP‒15 OCT 
1997 865 37 31 91 
7 OPERATION SUN 
21‒28 FEBRUARY 
2008 240 Unknown 27   
  SUM 6291 1786 290 739 
Table 1.   Major Cross-Border Operations of Turkey and Their Results.160 
In three decades of time, TAF conducted almost 88 hot pursuits and 
cross-border operations and at least 25 of them were in large-scale operations. 
The 1990s’ operations were  igger in scale and made  y land forces, while the 
2000s’ operations were mainly air force based, supported by intelligence 
provided by the U.S. and unmanned aircraft.161 
Table 1 shows the effectiveness of those operations. Contrary to general 
claims about the ineffectiveness of Turkey’s cross-border operations, TAF gained 
the initiative over the PKK as a result of these operations, and PKK lost a lot of 
members and was breaking down by the second half of the 1990s. 
Turkey claims  raq’s ina ility to exercise its authority over Northern  raq 
after 1991 led the nation to protect its own security with limited in time and scope 
cross-border operations. In this way, these operations cannot be regarded as a 
violation of  raq’s sovereignty since  raq was una le to control the use of its 
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territory by the PKK.162 As a result, despite  raq’s repeated protests and 
international condemnation efforts, Turkey has avoided the Security Council’s 
condemnation.163  
In 2007, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution authorizing TAF 
operations in Northern Iraq against the PKK.164 Since then Turkey has continued 
its operations against the PKK. The U.S. gave its support in the two mentioned 
timeframes to Turkey. The probability of a full-scale incursion against Northern 
Iraq, may have led the U.S. to support Turkey’s cross-border operations.165 
1. The 1993‒1995 Unilateral So-called Ceasefires 
Ocalan’s announcement of a so-called unilateral ceasefire in 1993 was a 
result of the difficult situation his organization felt as a consequence of the cross-
border operations and especially the 1992 Northern Iraq cross-border operation 
by the TAF. However, this was more a tactical move rather than a genuine 
peace-making attempt. As such, though the PKK managed to escalate the level 
of violence between 1993 and 1997 up to a point, it ended up losing a lot of 
members in the same period. Table 2 represents the casualty numbers between 
Turkey and the PKK in these years. There is a significant rise in the casualty 
numbers in this period. For both sides, 1994 is the most deadly year. The 1993 
and 1995 so-called unilateral ceasefires of the PKK could be evaluated as a 
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Casualty Table Between 1984‒
2000 
  PKK Civilians Officials 
1984 33 20 26 
1985 108 67 58 
1986 61 57 51 
1987 106 217 71 
1988 134 91 54 
1989 191 160 153 
1990 417 160 161 
1991 427 127 244 
1992 1340 487 629 
1993 1949 932 715 
1994 4111 682 1145 
1995 3007 292 772 
1996 3063 130 608 
1997 2330 148 518 
1998 1583 71 383 
1999 1017 78 236 
2000 307 27 29 
Table 2.   Casualty Numbers of State and PKK between 1984 and 
2000.166 
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Figure 6.  Graph of Casualty Numbers between 1984 and 2000. 
It is clearly visible that from the perspective of both sides there is an 
increase in the casualty numbers between 1993 and 1997. PKK casualties 
reached unmanageable levels especially for those years, whereas the state’s 
losses are considerably manageable, but high. Therefore, a partially perceived 
stalemate can be claimed in those years, during which the PKK announced its 
so-called unilateral ceasefires in 1993 and 1995, respectively. The losses of both 
sides reached their peak in 1994; on the other hand, state losses decreased by 
the end of 1995 and this balance led to a win for state. 
Turgut Ozal was the eighth president of the Turkish Republic by the time 
Ocalan announced his so-called unilateral ceasefire decision in 1993. Talabani, 
the PUK leader and one of the strong actors of Northern Iraq Kurdish 
Community, was shown up at the announcement of Ocalan. According to some, 
he was the back channel of Ozal, and the announcement was an indirect result 
of  zal’s optimism for a federative solution idea. The same perspective also 
connects the end of the process with the death of Ozal.167 It is at this time 
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unclear whether Ozal played any direct or indirect role in the announcement of 
that ceasefire. However, it is a well-known fact that the calls of state leaders to 
the PKK to disarm were always presented by the PKK as an approach by the 
state to negotiate. The process ended with 33 unarmed soldiers’ deaths by a 
PKK ambush in Bingol during their transportation to their units.168  
The second announcement of  calan came when T F’s cross-border 
operations increased and again forced the PKK to declare their so-called January 
15, 1995 unilateral ceasefire just one month before the elections. It was also 
followed  y the coalition government’s  rime Minister Er akan’s individual effort 
to win the release of kidnapped soldiers.169 These kinds of back channel 
communications by individuals were evaluated differently from the standpoint of 
the PKK, which aimed to gain political leverage by using similar types of 
kidnappings in the 2000s. Er akan’s call for unity under the um rella of Turkish 
nationality rather than Islam was also promising from the point of view of the 
PKK.170 
Erbakan  one of Turkey’s  slamic figures  had  ecome the prime minister 
in June 1996. Zu eyir  ydar  one of    ’s leading figures in Europe  reached 
Erbakan through Ismail Nacar, who was an Islamic writer and NGO 
spokesperson for the mediation of the problem. Erbakan appointed the Welfare 
Party (RP) deputy for Van province to conduct negotiations along with Nacar. But 
those talks in short time were leaked to the press and all the opposing parties 
criticized the idea of negotiating with terrorists. The TAF also openly reacted 
against those kinds of mediation efforts. A coalition partner, the True Path Party 
(DYP), took a position against its partner. After those harsh criticisms and 
debates, mediators announced they were not talking on behalf of the Welfare 
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Party or the government. In the end, even Erbakan stepped back and declared 
that the state could not negotiate with terrorists.171  
2. The 1998‒1999 Unilateral So-called Ceasefires 
By the late 1990s the situation was a checkmate rather than a stalemate. 
The PKK and Abdullah Ocalan were under great pressure from the Turkish state; 
the losses of the terrorist organization put them on the verge of breakdown again. 
By 1998, TAF established full control over most of southeast Turkey, confining 
the PKK to inaccessible mountain areas.172 After establishing its control over the 
field, Turkey increased its pressure on the Syrian government for the extradition 
of Ocalan and ending its support of the PKK. In parallel with the MGK decision, 
which was planning to levy war on Syria incase Syria continues to support the 
PKK, the commander of Land Forces, General Atilla Ates, in one of his speeches 
in the border area of Hatay, threatened Syria for cutting off its support to the 
PKK.173 Then, 10,000 troops were deployed to the Syrian border,174 and that 
costly signal produced the desired outcome. On September 1, 1998, Ocalan 
announced another so-called unilateral ceasefire in order to present himself as a 
peace seeker. Syria then expelled him from the country on October 9, 1998175. 
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He escaped to Europe and travelled to Russia, Italy, and Greece. Finally, 
Greek contacts led him to Kenya where he was captured on February 15, 1999. 
U.S. intelligence assisted Turkey in capturing Ocalan.176 After fifteen years of 
fighting against terrorism, Turkey had a great success with the capture of Ocalan. 
It did not take much time before Ocalan called for another so-called 
unilateral ceasefire for the PKK on September 1, 1999 from his jail on the Imrali 
Island. He asked the PKK to retreat to Northern Iraq and look for a political 
solution. The PKK withdrew its members from Turkey as ordered by Ocalan.177  
Ocalan was found guilty of multiple charges against the state on June 29, 
1999 and sentenced to death. Since Turkey abolished the death penalty in 
August 2002 for the sake of EU membership, his sentence was commuted to life 
imprisonment.178 After that time  calan’s priority was the future of his sentence. 
The timing of  calan’s 1999 call was interesting in that he announced it between 
the announcement of his death penalty verdict and the Supreme Court’s 
ratification of his verdict.   
The first phase of the PKK, 1984 to 1999, ended with the perception of a 
big loss for the     and  calan. The question here is “was there any moment or 
feeling of stalemate between the sides ” The most violent era was the period 
between 1993 and 1997, during which some back channel incentives could be 
considered as individual efforts to stop the bloodshed and provide an alternative 
way out for the terrorist organization and the state. The long life span of    ’s 
terror  the pu lic’s weariness, and the continuing economic costs of countering 
the PKK could partially create a perceived stalemate from the point of view of the 
state, no matter how superior the state was on the field.  
The economic dimension of the problem was manageable for both sides, 
although Turkey faced some economic recessions in that period—in 1986, 1988, 
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1989, 1991, 1994, 1998‒1999 and 2000.179 The 1994 economic crisis was 
especially bad, and could be closely linked with increased counterterrorism 
costs.180 Terrorism was not a direct trigger of all those recessions, but the costly 
expenditures such as technology acquisition and cross-border operations against 
the PKK could be named as indirect reasons for some of those economic crises. 
The regional developments, especially the Gulf War, and the sanctions on Iraq 
negatively influenced the fragile Turkish economy.181 
Against all those negative side effects Turkey continued its fight against 
PKK terror and won in the end. There were some elements of a stalemate, but 
most importantly on the field TAF never lost the initiative to the PKK. The hit and 
run tactics of the PKK created limited and temporary gains from its perspective. 
However, they could not spread the violence to the western side of the country. 
Their attacks in the western regions were all limited and small scale. 
Northern Iraq provided not only an operational, but also a financial and 
demographically safe haven for the PKK. They managed to integrate themselves 
to a Kurdish “Mafia”-led heroin trafficking business. The black market of Iraq 
provided them with guns and money. Therefore, their only concern was to hold 
their losses manageable and recruit every year new members to replace their 
losses. However, the increase in the casualties of the PKK was unmanageable 
during the period of 1993‒1997. 
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D. INTERVAL: THE 1999‒2004 PERIOD 
It was a win for the Turkish state, but what type of a win was the question. 
Gordon McCormick defines win types as weak, strong, and complete.182 A weak 
win refers to one in which the prevailing party pushes the other to its breakpoint, 
but not having control over the political space due to either unwillingness or 
inability. A strong win occurs when two conditions are met; pushing the opponent 
to its breakpoint and controlling the political space so that reorganization can not 
take place. Finally, a complete win can be achieved only by ending the 
motivation of the opponent, along with the other two conditions. Therefore, a 
complete win confers a natural control over the political space rather an artificial 
one, as in the strong win.183 At this point Ocalan’s capture and his call to the PKK 
to withdraw to Northern Iraq was a win between weak and strong types for the 
Turkish state. The external political safe haven of Northern Iraq provided PKK a 
reorganization space. Although Turkey established full control over its soil for a 
strong win, Northern  raq’s protective position for     was a major o stacle in 
front of Turkey.  
In that nonviolent period some spectacular external events took place. 
After the 9/11 attacks the U.S.-led War on Terror led with the occupation of 
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Before Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003, the use of U.S. bases in Turkey and the opening of a way for 
the second north front was declined by the Turkish National Assembly on March 
1, which damaged the trust and relations between the U.S. and Turkish 
governments. Moreover, the detention of eleven Turkish Special Forces 
personnel in Northern Iraq by U.S. troops increased the level of crisis on July 4. 
The rejection of the resolution (Tezkere184) on March 1, left Turkey out of the 
decision making process for the reshaping of Iraq after the fall of Saddam. By 
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contrast, the Kurds of Iraq played their Northern Alliance role very well and 
gathered the semiautonomous position as a first step to their long-held dream of 
an independent state. At the same time, the PKK was reorganizing and building 
its capacity. Former Iraq Army weapons were all over the black market of Iraq. 
Even though in the aftermath of 9/11 the PKK was designated as a terrorist 
organization and isolated, no specific counter measures were taken by the 
international community by the early 2000s. The PKK changed its name to 
KADEK and KONGRA-GEL, to remove itself from the international terrorism 
list.185  
The deterioration of relations with the U.S. led Turkey to seek regional 
cooperation against the new Kurdish structure emerging in Northern Iraq and 
also the PKK threat. The overlapping concern for Syria, Iran and Turkey was the 
same, that  RG’s semiautonomous structure could agitate those countries’ local 
Kurds to demand a similar type of autonomy, and it was a direct threat to the 
regional status quo.186  
The foundation of a regional response emerged in April 2003. Turkey, Iran 
and Syria began talks for establishing a consensus and cooperation for the 
postwar period. Bilateral talks were held between Turkey and Syria, and Turkey 
and Iran regarding the Kurdish security challenge, and countries began 
information sharing on the PKK and PKK-affiliate PJAK activities. Especially 
during the spring and early summer of 2006, Iran and Turkey escalated the 
cooperation level by attacking PKK and PJAK bases in Northern Iraq.187 
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E. SECOND PHASE: THE 2004‒2014 PERIOD 
In 2004, after five years of inaction, the PKK started its armed campaign 
again. The PKK pursued a dual strategy comprising a rural insurgency in 
southeastern parts of Turkey and an urban political campaign throughout the 
cities of Turkey. In the 2000s, rather than a achieving a military victory or 
territorial gain as in the 1990s, PKK was aiming to exert political leverage in the 
hope of forcing concessions from Turkish authorities.188 Mass protests, named 
“Serhildan,” were planned, aimed at attracting both domestic and especially 
international attraction. The intensity of the conflict diminished in that period. 
   ’s attacks were conducted  y small groups of four to six terrorists, and they 
were mainly improvised explosive device attacks due to the superiority of the 
TAF in the field. Between 2002 and 2012 around 74 percent of the events took 
place in six provinces of the southeastern side of the country: Bingol, Diyarbakir, 
Hakkari, Siirt, Sirnak and Tunceli.189 Seasonally, PKK attacks decreased from 
early December to late March due to harsh weather conditions, and intensified 
from July to October.190 The major reason for that low level of violence was likely 
the heavy losses of PKK during 1990s. While the PKK had approximately 10,000 
recruits in the 1990s, by the 2000s their numbers had decreased by half to 4000 
to 5000.191 Overall, those small scale and limited attacks were manageable from 
the state’s perspective. 
After 2004, the PKK, in accordance with the orders of Ocalan, announced 
four different so-called unilateral ceasefire decisions; in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 
2013, respectively. The first one was mainly because of the regional 
developments, whereas the latter three might have been the result of covert 
communications between the two sides. 
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The U.S. approach against the Kurdish community of Iraq was moderate 
since they were the one specific community who welcomed the invasion of Iraq. 
U.S. backing of the PUK and KDP helped to create the de facto Kurdish state 
within Northern  raq after the adoption of  raq’s Transnational  dministrative Law 
(TAL) on March 8, 2004.192 TAL offered substantial improvements for the Kurds 
in Iraq. First, the Kurdish language was recognized as one of the country’s official 
languages. Second, displaced Kurds gained the right to return to their homes. 
Third and most importantly, KRG received a share proportionate to its population 
from  raq’s rich oil revenues.193 
As a consequence of the situation of KRG, just a short time after the TAL 
was signed, Kurdish rioting erupted in Syria in March 2004. Similarly, by June 
2004, PKK had started its armed campaign again. The PJAK, a PKK affiliate, 
was established with the aim of fomenting a Kurdish separatist agenda in Iran.194 
In this sense, the U.S. desire for stability in Northern Iraq was promoting 
insta ility for  raq’s neighbors. 
There were several reasons for the PKK to start an armed campaign 
again, despite the promising reforms addressing their grievances at the 
beginning of the 2000s. First, the power vacuum after the Iraq War was 
exploitable. Second, the KRG reached a level of autonomy that PKK had sought 
for years. Third, and most importantly, inaction of PKK brought some internal 
debates and discussions, which led to some splintering within the organization. 
Ocalan aimed to rally sympathizers and organization members around the PKK 
flag against the state in order to consolidate his power and prevent internal 
organizational debates.195 
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1. The 2006 So-called Unilateral Ceasefire  
The 2006 so-called unilateral ceasefire decision of Ocalan and PKK was 
due to the ramifications of the improved relations between the U.S. and Turkey. 
Relations that had worsened just before the Iraq War in 2003 normalized in late 
2006. Moreover, Turkey began to press the U.S. about its opposition to cross-
border operations against the PKK camps in Iraq.196 As a result, during 2006 the 
U.S. increased its intelligence support to Turkey against the PKK.197 On the other 
hand, the KRG was also looking for a stable environment and increased 
economic relations with Turkey as a new emerging structure. Turkey’s suspicions 
over the  RG’s overlapping effect in Turkey took a back seat to mutually 
developing economic benefits.198 That is why the only obstacle in front of the 
KRG and U.S. for a more sta le environment in Northern  raq was    ’s 
violence. To prevent the intervention of Turkey in Northern Iraq and the 
rapprochement of Turkey and two U.S. adversaries, most probably those 
stakeholders persuaded the PKK to stop the armed campaign.199  
The closer relationship between the U.S. and Turkey created a new 
coordination mechanism for the PKK issue. Former Commander of Land Forces 
General (ret.) Edip Baser and a former NATO commander General (ret.) Joseph 
Ralston were appointed to the counterterrorism coordination branch against the 
PKK. But this mechanism failed to produce any concrete results, and ended with 
the resignation of Edip Baser in early 2007.200  
In short time, the PKK started its armed attacks again, attacking the 
Daglica Outpost in September 2007, leaving 12 soldiers killed and 16 more 
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injured.201 Following further actions in November of the same year, the U.S. 
agreed that Turkey could launch cross-border operations. The first air raid took 
place on December 16, 2007. The U.S. provided actionable intelligence via 
satellite imagery to Turkey.202 Further raids continued during the first eight 
months of 2008, and in February 2008 the T F started the “ peration Sun” 
cross-border operation with land forces which were supported by Air Force 
bombings. Over 600 terrorists were killed in the air raids and    ’s major 
infrastructure was disrupted.203 
2. The 2009, 2011 and 2013 So-called Unilateral Ceasefires 
On April 13, 2009,    ’s sixth so-called unilateral ceasefire decision was 
announced. It is most likely that before the announcement some back channel 
communications took place between PKK and MIT. Moreover a few months later 
in August, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan announced a new project: Democratic 
Opening, or the National Unity and Brotherhood Project, which aimed to build 
some new social, political, cultural, and economic incentives for Turkish Kurds 
along with some other ethnic communities.204 On October 19, 34 PKK 
members—26 of them from the Mahmur Camp and not operational terrorists, 
mostly women, the elderly and children—and eight terrorists from Kandil, entered 
Turkey from the Habur Customs Gate.205 A couple of thousand Turkish Kurds, 
mostly comprised of BDP members, welcomed them. A temporary court was 
established in the Habur due to security concerns, and the verdict was released 
to accept their surrenders. The BDP and PKK convert Habur surrendering of 
terrorists to a big welcoming show. The public anger grew all over the Turkey. 
There were a lot of street protests against such an embarrassing event. Due to 
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the public frustration and critics, the government felt itself guilty of the situation 
and froze the Democratic opening for a while.206  
 t the same time M T was holding some covert meetings with the    ’s 
front leaders Mustafa Karasu and Sabri Ok, in Oslo, and their fourth meeting was 
leaked to the press. Interestingly, the head of MIT, Hakan Fidan, was 
participating in that fourth meeting and claiming he was there on behalf of the 
Prime Minister.207    ’s sixth so-called unilateral ceasefire decision could have 
been a consequential result of those covert meetings and the Democratic 
Opening, but the process backfired with the Habur show. 
In April 2009, the Turkish Judicial Authorities and Turkish Police started 
detaining KCK members in different cities across Turkey. It was an unexpected 
and crucial  low for    ’s parallel structure, KCK. Authorities arrested 3,895 
people for being members of the PKK by the end of 2011.208    ’s shadow 
structure on Turkey’s soil was disrupted. Consequently, on August 13, 2010, 
KCK announced the PKK would stop its attacks for 40 days. Later, the period 
was extended until the 2011 elections, but by March the KCK claimed that due to 
   ’s denial and annihilation policies the PKK ended the process.209 KCK trials 
weakened the structure of the PKK. Until then those trials had become another 
subject of bargaining for the PKK.  
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During 2012, the PKK changed its strategy and aimed to gain control in 
some parts of Turkey. Consequently, in Semdinli, they had a lot of casualties 
because of the T F’s superiority in the field.210 Most probably the PKK aimed to 
escalate the violence and reach a stalemate, not militarily but politically. The 
hunger strikes by some imprisoned PKK members due to the prison conditions of 
 calan after that hot summer in late 2012  and  calan’s call for them to end 
those strikes, opened a new phase for the negotiations between the two sides.211 
Some people claimed this was a set up for presenting Ocalan as a palatable 
negotiation partner. The AKP government started overt dialogue this time with 
Ocalan. Prime Minister Erdogan said in one of his speeches that they started 
talks with Ocalan via MIT.212 As a consequence the last announcement of 
Ocalan came in May 2013, asking PKK to withdraw to Northern Iraq.213  
As a response to the public pressure for a moderate approach to 
government, a group of 63 people from every part of society—the academicians, 
artists, writers, etc.—formed a group of “smart men” ( kil  damlar). This group 
started an information campaign about the Opening process and prepared a 
report for the government to consider some steps as milestones. At most of the 
places they visited they held public meetings, and they were heavily protested, 
especially in the western side of the country.214   
Erdogan is currently serving his third and final term as prime minister 
according to their party’s own internal regulation. As such, he will most likely be 
the party’s candidate for the 2014 Presidential elections. But, perhaps precisely 
because the Presidency of Turkish Republic is a symbolic role, Erdogan has 
recently discussed the possibility of a new system with increased powers for the 
president. Meanwhile, all other major parties  especially the Repu lican  eople’s 
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Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) oppose Erdogan’s proposal, 
saying it could open the door to greater authoritarianism in the country. At the 
same time, the 1984 Constitution is subject to a major rewrite and political parties 
are still working on it. Therefore, in order to unlock the impasse, Erdogan may 
count on the support of 36 BDP parliamentarians.215 Erdogan’s open references 
to the province system216 sound promising to the PKK. This political situation 
could be referred to as an enticing opportunity for both sides, with the promise of 
beneficial outcomes. 
In politics, a new Kurdish party emerged in December 2012, The Free 
Cause Party (Hur Dava Partisi), which is said to be related to the Turkish 
Hizbulah that fought with the PKK in 2002. Huda-Par, an abbreviated form of the 
party name, means Party of God, and it is enjoying good relations with Hamas 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. So it may be one major contender for the 
southeastern Kurdish vote in addition to AKP and BDP.217 In the light of these 
converging interests and political calculations, both sides were pushed into an 
embrace.218  
Table 3 presents the casualty numbers during the period of 2000 to 2012 
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Casualty Table Between 2000‒
2012 
  PKK Civilians Officials 
2000 307 27 29 
2001 157 11 20 
2002 50 11 7 
2003 101 10 31 
2004 135 16 75 
2005 193 18 105 
2006 149 18 111 
2007 264 20 146 
2008 227 29 171 
2009 68 18 62 
2010 137 21 88 
2011 211 17 99 
2012 973 6 144 
Table 3.   Casualty Numbers of the State and PKK between 2000 
and 2012.219 
 
Figure 7.  Graph of Casualty Numbers of the State and PKK between 
2000 and 2010. 
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It can be seen that there is a slight increase in the casualty numbers of 
terrorists and the state after 2004; the so-called unilateral ceasefires dropped the 
casualty numbers temporarily. The relatively high number of casualties in 2007 
and 2008 explaining the 2009 call for a so-called unilateral ceasefire, but the 
most spectacular point is that the 2012 PKK strategy to control areas resulted in 
the escalation of the conflict and a rise in the    ’s casualty num ers to 
unmanageable levels. Although the PKK casualties were greatest in 2012, the 
numbers suggest that both sides would be able to continue the conflict. PKK 
most probably aimed to reach a political stalemate rather than a military one 
throughout the negotiation process, though the expectedly high losses suggests 
an illogical, suicidal move in the field that cost them more recruits than the 
previous eight years cumulative casualty numbers.  
One other calculation for the AKP government could be the Arab uprising 
in the Middle East and its repercussions in Syria. Turkey overtly took a position 
against Assad’s government that used chemicals on its own population. The 
Syrian  urds’ uprising and search for autonomy, their fight against the Al-Qaeda 
recruits  and the     mem ers’ participation in this fight in support of  YD could 
be some other side elements of the de-escalation of the conflict in Turkey. 
For the last three so-called unilateral ceasefire decisions, it can be 
claimed that they were the result of enticing opportunities for both sides in the 
continuum of the conflict. First, from the perspective of the ruling party, AKP, they 
increased their domestic power during the nonviolent periods and gained support 
from the southeastern part of the country in the elections (in which the AKP and 
BDP shared the majority of the votes). However, the 2009 Habur incident 
increased the anger of the population in the western parts of the country and the 
process stopped for a time. Second, a new constitution is promising for both 
sides for their desired outcomes. Third, for Ocalan and arrested KCK members 
and the disrupted PKK, the only hope is the negotiation processes. Erdogan’s 
leadership and  calan’s changed attitude promise hope for a solution to the 
problem with those emerging opportunities.  
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The PKK case provides deep insight for both models with its past and 
continuing events. The 1990s present partial examples of the classic ripeness 
model with evidence of a mutually hurting stalemate, whereas the 2000s 
presents examples of mutually enticing opportunities. In fact these two 
timeframes could be considered as the evolution of the problem from zero sum to 
a win-win proposition for both sides with its mutually enticing opportunities. From 
Turkey’s standpoint, the costly expenditures and some internal unrest could be 
alleviated by the solution to the PKK problem, whereas from the PKK point of 
view, the organization has been destroyed and reconciliation increasingly looked 
like the best outcome. Additionally, another checkmate is probable. For Ocalan, if 
he misses the chance he got from Turkish authorities, he will most likely never 
have another opportunity to be a part of the negotiation. In this concluding 
section a comparison of the two periods may help to illustrate the implication of 
the theory to the case.  
For the 1990s, after completing its capacity building, the PKK strategically 
aimed to escalate the violence with armed attacks against state institutions. In 
addition, the PKK also aimed to spread its terror activities to the western part of 
the country, especially in the tourism areas, but the latter strategy caused 
international reaction and negatively affected the organization. Moreover     ’s 
urban strategy was limited in scope and easy to monitor so that it could not 
produce the desired outcomes. On the other hand, during the same period the 
state reorganized itself according to needs of the low intensity conflict, and 
technology, personnel and organizational restructuring gave the initiative to the 
state. The VGS system hindered    ’s narrative. From the perspective of the 
state, one major shortcoming was that the conduct of the counterterrorism effort 
was only by military means. The reforms necessary to address the grievances of 
   ’s target population were missing. Therefore, the PKK always found space to 
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maneuver even though it was alienating its target population with the use of 
violence.  
A significant reason for the shortcomings of the state might be the limited 
political spectrum of ruling parties. In those years, governments were coalition 
governments. Terrorism was generally considered a security problem, and 
though the military leaders called for wider approaches such as economic and 
social reforms, the struggle was stuck in the military dimension and lacked a 
political approach. From    ’s point of view, the main actor was Ocalan. 
According to the PKK side, he is still the sole and final decision maker of the 
organization, and the realization of a negotiated outcome is likely to happen only 
if Ocalan plays a role in the process.220 This means that one important part of the 
negotiation will  e his jail conditions or release.  calan’s calls for peace in the 
1990s were tactical rather than sincere. There was a tendency to call for peace 
only when PKK was in a difficult situation because of the TAF’s superiority on the 
field. Therefore, Ocalan’s calls for so-called unilateral ceasefires in the 1990s 
could be considered playing for time to reorganize. The PKK tried to make each 
ceasefire appear bilateral rather than unilateral. According to the PKK, the 1993 
so-called unilateral ceasefire was linked with President Turgut Ozal; the 1996 so-
called unilateral ceasefire was linked with Prime Minister Erbakan, and the 1998 
and 1999 so-called unilateral ceasefires were speculatively linked with the 
military.221 These claims are not substantiated and are sourced only to terrorists, 
so they are not convincing. Most probably, even if they were real, these attempts 
were aimed at giving a way out for the PKK. Every call for peace by the state 
demanded the PKK to disarm and demobilize without any preconditions. 
According to the resource concept, although the PKK exhausted much of 
its resources in 1990s, with its high casualties and great financial needs, it was 
successful at least in recouping its huge casualty numbers with new recruits. The 
PKK also benefited from the safe havens with which it had been provided. Syria’s 
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state sponsorship and Northern  raq’s failed governance after the Gulf War 
provided the PKK with use of both countries for logistical purposes, as well as 
operational purposes. At the same time, the PKK controlled entrance routes into 
Europe for drug trafficking, and its links with the Kurdish Mafia enabled the 
terrorist organization to convert itself into a transnational criminal organization 
over time. European front organizations also provided the PKK with generous 
income for years.222 On the other hand, Turkey’s economy was not very strong in 
the 1990s. For instance, the 1994 economic crises could be linked to the 
increased costs from the counterterrorism efforts and incursions into Northern 
Iraq. 
In summary, the beginning of the 1990s was more likely a MHS since 
there was high tension caused by violence and no foreseeable outcome for either 
side. The long duration of conflict was causing weariness. The public was 
frustrated by the hit and run tactics of the    . But Turkey’s determination to go 
on fighting with the PKK left the PKK and Ocalan without an option, and in the 
end Ocalan was captured. The 1998 and 1999 calls of Ocalan for so-called 
unilateral ceasefires were due to his realization of his and    ’s impending 
defeat. Consequently, the PKK withdrew to Northern Iraq.  
In contrast, the reincarnation of PKK in the early part of this century 
changed the nature of the conflict. The PKK was much weaker than it had been 
in the 1990s; external developments such as 9/11 put the PKK in a more difficult 
situation. Its criminal facet started to attract attention and the global War on 
Terror isolated it.223   
Strategically, the PKK followed a hybrid strategy: in addition to its armed 
campaign, PKK aimed to politicize the conflict. It started to reshape its political 
wing as a covert shadow structure—the KCK—that was positioned as an 
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alternative to the state, especially in the southeastern parts of the country. In the 
2000s PKK attacks were limited to a few specific cases. Similar to their situation 
in the 1990s they could not expand their attacks to the western side of the 
country. But the PKK-affiliated civil obedience; street protests and Nevrouz 
displays were increasing. A PKK-linked political party is also one of the major 
rivals of the governing party in the southeastern side of the country. In the last 
local elections AKP and BDP almost shared all the provinces of the region. 
Although it is a well-known fact that PKK intimidates people in the region for their 
votes, in one way, the dual share of the votes could also be considered as the 
region’s people supporting the negotiations.  
From a political point of view, AKP has the self-sufficiency for some kind of 
approach to address the PKK issue. The AKP has its chairs in the Assembly, and 
the 2014 presidential elections and a new constitution appear as mutually 
enticing opportunities for AKP and BDP to cooperate. Prime Minister Erdogan put 
his political career at stake by negotiating with PKK for a solution to the problem. 
A non-declared cooperation will likely follow for the 2014 presidential election and 
a new constitutional study. The     and Erdogan need the BD ’s support in the 
election; on the other hand, a new constitution with expanded cultural rights 
motivates the BDP to cooperate with the AKP. From the point of view of Ocalan, 
he is not the same person as he was in the 1990s. He has been in prison on 
Imrali Island for 15 years and the opportunity for negotiation may be his last 
resort. As his thoughts and understandings have changed from his limited 
communist standpoint to a wider democratic view, his goals are subject to 
change on behalf of his future.224  
Turkey in the 2000s is more powerful economically; the average per capita 
income has increased from $3000 in the 1990s to $10,500 in 2012.225 Turkey’s 
economy may further improve with a solution to the PKK problem. The increasing 
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mutual economic relations with KRG are expected to continue, and those 
relations should force the PKK to be positioned on the side of the solution or else 
they will become more isolated. 
Overall, the PKK is estimated to have lost around 22,101 members. On 
the other hand, from the state’s perspective, PKK terror has caused many civilian 
killings throughout its history—5,557 civilians have lost their lives. In addition to 
that, combatant losses reach 7,918.226 Material losses and the economic burden 
of the problem have cost Turkey $300 billion. The most promising reward is the 
end of bloodshed. 
Although the negotiation process continues back and forth, progress 
seems likely after the 2015 general elections. An election and five-year window 
for the AKP might produce some steps forward in the process for both sides.   
This thesis aimed to test under which conditions in terrorism cases sides 
feel themselves in stalemates. A historical case study of Turkey and the PKK 
terrorist organization was used to test a hypothesis. William Zartman’s Theory of 
Ripeness handles this question using the mutual hurting stalemate phenomenon 
as a condition of ripeness and one of the direct reasons for a decision to 
negotiate. While exploring the theory, the writer also came up with the idea of 
importing Mitchell and Crocker’s mutually enticing opportunities to model as a 
condition of ripeness for both sides. Although Zartman imported the same 
concept as an independent variable of a successful negotiation decision for both 
sides, this thesis used it as an internal ripeness condition and located it as a third 
ripeness element. 
Zartman’s original independent varia les of ripeness, the objective 
elements and persuasion, respectively, referred differently to cost benefit 
analysis of resources, strategies, and political will and external developments. 
The optimistic or pessimistic way of evaluation pointed to the psychological 
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dimension of interaction between the adversaries. As in this case study, 
pessimism may lead each side to perceive an MHS, while optimism may lead 
them to perceive MEOs conditionally. 
The reinterpreted model of the Ripeness Theory sounds promising; 
however, more empirical studies are required for testing the theory itself. Since 
conflicts evolve, a theory also needs to be developed. The PKK case with its 
three decades long continuum provides instances of perceived stalemates. The 
first period cases examined are closer to the original model concept, whereas the 
second period cases are closer to the reinterpreted model. 
The independent variables show that the cost-benefit analyses of 
adversaries during prolonged conflicts affect the future of the conflicts. Since 
terrorism cases are typically sustained for long times, sides first have to apply the 
correct strategy for success. From a state’s point of view, it should seek not only 
a military but also political strategy against the terrorists. On the other hand, for 
terrorists the most promising strategy is to work towards reachable goals, and to 
try to sustain the conflict as long as possible. Time works for terrorists, and even 
though they experience difficulties by high casualties, in the end they can reach 
some concessions simply by persisting.  
Resources are the tangible assets that show both sides the objective 
outcome of the conflicts. Adversaries perceive turning points as their resources 
change, and they can decide to change their approaches to the problem 
accordingly.  
Regional developments such as the Gulf War, Iraq War, and Arab Spring 
had crucial consequences for the outcome and direction of the conflict. 
Adversaries’ cost benefit analyses were heavily affected by those developments, 
and an MHS or MEOs may arise as consequences of these developments. 
The political will of the contending sides is also subject to change over 
time with the change in public opinion and the individuals in power during the 
conflict. 
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A future study about how states break the impasse against terrorism may 
provide a broader understanding of success in the context of these prolonged 
conflicts. The hypotheses discussed in this thesis provide meaningful ways to 
handle the problem of stalemates. A broader strategic-level accord may lead 
states to break the stalemates. Also technological innovations in weapons are 
likely to change the information asymmetry in favor of states. The usage of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), such as predator drones, may change the 
course of events and break the stalemates in favor of states.  
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